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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Statement of Facts 
This case involves a claim for personal injury by the Appellant, David Stiles, who was a 
social guest of a tenant occupying property located at 756 W. 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho 83634. 
According to the Amended Complaint filed in this matter, at approximately 1 :00 a.m. on July 8, 
2011, Mr. Stiles entered the premises to attend a social gathering involving alcohol being held in 
the backyard organized and conducted by one of the tenants, Jon Sullivan. (R. pp. 13-14).1 Jon 
Sullivan is Mr. Stiles' cousin. (R. p. 87). Mr. Stiles alleges that at some point during the night, 
he attempted to leave the property by exiting the backyard through a gate and onto a walkway 
located on the side of the house. (R. p. 14). Mr. Stiles asserts that while exiting the property, he 
tripped on a tree limb approximately four inches in diameter and one and a half feet long that 
was located on the walkway. (R. p. 14). 
Further, Mr. Stiles alleges that the presence of the tree limb caused him to fall forward 
into a wooden-frame glass window, which was allegedly standing in the walkway and propped 
up against a fence, whereupon he sustained personal injuries. (R. pp. 14-15). There is no dispute 
that the Appellant was a social guest of tenant Jon Sullivan. (R. p. 13, 197). Mr. Stiles' primary 
allegation in this matter is that Walter Amundson, as the owner of the property, owed him a duty 
as a licensee to share his knowledge of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities on the 
property and to avoid causing willful and wanton injury to him. (R. p. 17, paragraph 20). 
There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Amundson is the owner of the property located at 
756 W. 4th Street, Kuna, Idaho 83634. Mr. Amundson purchased the real property at issue in this 
1 In the Amended Complaint, the Appellant asserts that tenant Roger Amundson co-hosted the party on 
July 8, 2011. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion, as it is undisputed in 
the record that Jon Sullivan hosted the party and personally invited the Respondent to attend the party in 
the early morning hours of July 8, 2011. (R. p. 61 ). 
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litigation sometime in 2007. (R. p. 46). He has never personally resided in the residence and has 
always utilized the residence as a rental property. (R. p. 46). He also personally manages the 
property and has never utilized the services of a property manager. (R. p. 46). 
In July 2011, there were three tenants renting the property at issue. (R. p. 46). The 
tenants included Jon Sullivan, Wayne Jenkins and Walter's son, Roger Amundson. (R. p. 46). 
The tenants were in charge of keeping the property in a well-kept and clean condition. (R. p. 
46). If there were any repairs or maintenance which was needed with respect to the property, 
Walter undertook the responsibility pursuant to the lease agreements with the tenants to conduct 
such repairs and maintenance. (R. p. 46).2 
Walter Amundson generally visited the rental property twice per month. (R. p. 46). The 
primary purpose of those visits was to collect rent from tenants and also to perform any repairs 
or maintenance work if notified by one of the tenants that there was an issue with the property to 
address. (R. p. 4 7). Examples of some types of maintenance Walter has performed on the 
property prior to July 2011 included installing sprinklers, repairing the fence, replacing windows 
and fixing the roof. (R. p. 47). However, when visiting the property to collect rent or perform 
any requested maintenance, Walter did not generally inspect the entire property, as he respected 
the privacy of the tenants and relied on their input as to any concerns they had or maintenance 
issues they believed needed to be addressed. (R. p. 47). 
Prior to July 2011, Walter did not have any significant problems with the three tenants. 
(R. p. 47). All three tenants paid their rent and he had no complaints from neighbors regarding 
the tenants. (R. p. 47). Walter was generally aware that one of the tenants, Jon Sullivan, invited 
2 Appellant asserts that there is "no dispute that Amundson has exercised complete authority and control 
over the property since purchase in 2007." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 9. This statement was made 
without citation and completely mischaracterizes the record, as it is undisputed that there were three 
tenants occupying the property pursuant to lease agreements at the time of Mr. Stiles' accident. (R. p. 
46). 
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people over to the property for social gatherings in the backyard from time to time. (R. p. 4 7). 
However, he never received noise or any other complaints from neighbors and he is not aware of 
any occasions where law enforcement made a visit to the property due to any complaints or 
problems involving Mr. Sullivan's gatherings. (R. p. 47). 
Sometime in mid-June 2011, Walter removed a bay window from the home in order to 
install a garage door for the property, which would allow the tenants to store items such a 
motorcycle inside the garage. (R. p. 47). The window was approximately eight feet long and 
four feet high and weighed at least 200 pounds. (R. p. 47). Walter's son Roger helped him 
remove the window. (R. p. 47). 
Once Walter removed the window from the residence, Roger helped him move it and it 
was temporarily placed against a white picket fence next to the driveway at the front of the 
property until he could sell the window on Craigslist.3 (R. p. 48). At the time Walter and his son 
placed the window against the white picket fence, the window was intact and there was no 
broken glass. (R. p. 48). 
Walter later became aware that an incident involving Mr. Stiles occurred on July 8, 2011, 
whereby David Stiles allegedly fell and injured himself on the bay window when visiting the 
property while attending one of Mr. Sullivan's social gatherings. (R. p. 48). There is no dispute 
between the parties that Mr. Stiles was a social guest (licensee) of Mr. Sullivan when visiting the 
property at 1:00 a.m. on the morning of July 8, 2011. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6. 
Walter Amundson had never met Mr. Stiles prior to the subject lawsuit. (R. p. 48). He was not 
3 Appellant states in his Opening Brief (p. 6) that "the window was eventually placed against a cedar 
fence in the house's adjacent walkway." This statement mischaracterizes the evidence to the extent it 
implies that Walter Amundson had any role in moving the window from the white picket fence next to the 
driveway to the cedar fence further back on the side of the property or that he knew that the window was 
located next to the cedar fence at the time of the alleged accident. The record reflects that Walter 
Amundson played no role in moving the window from the area of the driveway against the white picket 
fence and had no awareness that it had become broken or had been moved against the cedar fence prior 
to the accident. (R. pp. 48-49). The only facts in the record are that Roger moved the window himself. 
(R. p. 60). 
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made aware of the alleged incident involving Mr. Stiles until a few days after it allegedly 
occurred. (R. p. 48). When Walter Amundson came to the property in mid-July 2011 to collect 
rent, tenant Wayne Jenkins generally explained to him that an incident occurred and Walter was 
shown the area where the incident allegedly occurred. (R. p. 48). 
Upon investigating the incident, Walter Amundson learned, for the first time, that the bay 
window was not in the location where he had initially placed it after removing it from the 
residence. (R. p. 48). Instead of leaning up against the white picket fence at the front of the 
property, it was leaning up against the cedar fence further back on the side of the property. (R. p. 
48). The only facts in the record are that Roger Amundson had moved the window to this 
location by himself. (R. pp. 60, 233-244).4 Walter Amundson also noticed upon investigating 
the accident that the window was broken. (R. p. 48).5 However, Walter was unable to 
' determine whether it became broken as a result of the incident involving Mr. Stiles. (R. p. 48). 
It was only after the subject lawsuit was filed that Walter came to learn that the window 
had become broken by one of the tenants while stored at the front of the property along the white 
picket fence. (R. p. 48). None of the tenants had informed him about the broken window prior 
to Mr. Stiles' accident. (R. pp. 118-119). He also learned that, at some point after the window 
had broken, it was moved by tenant Roger Amundson on only one occasion, and placed further 
back on the property and propped up against the cedar fence on the side of the residence. (R. pp. 
48-49, 233-244). It also wasn't until after the lawsuit was filed that Walter learned that the 
accident occurred when Mr. Stiles tripped on a wooden stump (apparently placed in that location 
4 The Appellant both misstates and incorrectly cites testimony from tenant Wayne Jenkins related to his 
recollection of the movement of the window from along the picket fence next to the driveway to the area 
where the accident occurred. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12. Mr. Jenkins actually testified that 
" ... all I know is that Roger moved it." (R. p. 233, depo p. 19:15-19). 
5 Appellant misstates the record by implying that Walter Amundson may have seen the broken window 
when he visited the property on June 5 or 6, 2011. However, in his deposition, Walter clearly testified that 
he did not recall checking on the window during that visit and was very clear in his deposition testimony 
that he did not notice a shattered pane in the window during the visit. (R. pp. 118-119). 
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by another tenant) which was resting on the pathway on the side of the house and fell into the 
window that, unbeknownst to Walter, had been moved from the white picket fence to the cedar 
fence in this area. (R. p. 49). 
Prior to the accident, Walter Amundson was never made aware that the tenants had 
placed or were storing any items on the side of the yard. (R. p. 49). He was also not aware of 
the existence of a wooden stump or the bay window being relocated in that area at the time of the 
alleged accident. (R. p. 49). While it is unknown who actually placed the wooden stump on the 
side of the house in the walkway, at least two things are clear: First, the wooden stump was not 
placed in this location by Walter Amundson; Second, the tenants knew that the wooden stump 
was in this location, but cannot agree on when the stump was placed in that location. Jon 
Sullivan recalls that nothing was placed in that area prior to July 8, 2011. (R. p. 97). Roger 
Amundson recalls that the stump may have been sitting in that location when he moved the 
broken window against the cedar fence (R. pp. 159-160). Regardless, there are no facts in the 
record that Walter Amundson knew about the broken window, the fact that it had been moved 
from the white picket fence or the existence of the wooden stump on the pathway on the side of 
the home prior to Mr. Stiles' accident. Moreover, he did not have "authority and control" over 
the premises since, as the landlord, he had to relinquish control to the three tenants occupying the 
property. 
The Appellant also raises a number of facts regarding the allegedly poor lighting in the 
area where the accident occurred and the manner in which that condition may have contributed 
to the trip/fall event. See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 13-14. However, these facts are 
irrelevant to the duty of care issues in this case. The proper focus of this case is which party had 
the duty to warn the Appellant about any hazards presented by the presence of a wooden stump 
in the walkway on the side of the house. 
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b. Course of Proceedings Below 
Appellant Stiles filed his First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on or 
about October 4, 2013. Walter Amundson filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on 
October 24, 2013. After significant discovery had been conducted and depositions taken, Mr. 
Amundson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 20, 2015. In his motion, Mr. 
Amundson argued that he did not owe a duty to warn Mr. Stiles about the existence of stump in 
the walkway or any potential danger caused by the presence of the broken window standing in 
the walkway and leaning up against a cedar fence on the side of the house. (R. pp. 26-43). Mr. 
Amundson asserted that the tenants, who were in control of the property, had created the alleged 
dangerous condition and they had the duty to warn Mr. Stiles, as they were in the best position to 
warn their own social guests of any potential dangerous conditions existing on the property. (R. 
pp. 26-43). Since Mr. Stiles had not asserted claims against the tenants, there was no available 
remedy to him in this lawsuit. 
The District Court heard argument on the summary judgment motion on March 9, 2015. 
The District Court first addressed Mr. Stiles' argument that Mr. Amundson, as the landlord, had 
a duty under Stephens v. Stearns to provide a warning of potentially dangerous conditions 
existing on the property to a tenant's social guest. The court found that the Stephens case had no 
application to this matter since Stephens involved a landlord's duty to his tenant, who is an 
invitee, not a licensee. (Tr. p. 21). The court also correctly cited the applicable duty owed by a 
possessor of property to a licensee - that there is a duty to warn the licensee of known dangers. 
(Tr. p. 38). 
The District Court then discussed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Robinson v. 
Mueller, noting that the Court in Robinson had rejected the contention that the duty of 
reasonable care owed by landlords to tenants should be extended to licensees. (Tr. pp. 38-39). 
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The court recognized that under Robinson, a landlord who conducts a repair to the property has a 
duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. (Tr. p. 40). However, the District Court found that 
Walter Amundson's removal of the window from the home was not the mechanism of injury in 
the case. (Tr. p. 40). Rather, the court found that the mechanism of injury was the combination 
of a dark walkway, the presence of a piece of wood in the walking path, and a broken window 
upon which someone stumbling on the wood could fall and injure themselves. (Tr. p. 40). 
Importantly, the District Court recognized "[t]he landlord has no duty to control the social 
activities of the tenant. And it is the social activities of the tenants that lead to the entrance by 
Mr. Stiles." (Tr. p. 41). Since the tenants, not the landlord, had a duty to warn Mr. Stiles of any 
known dangers existing on the property, the District Court granted Mr. Amundson's motion for 
summary judgment. (Tr. pp. 41-42). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Respondent on 
Appellant's premises liability claim on the basis that Respondent had no duty to warn 
the Appellant, a licensee, of alleged dangerous condition(s) on the property. 
B. Whether there is any factual or legal basis to hold Respondent liable for the 
Appellant's injuries due to a negligent repair of the property. 
C. Whether Respondent is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same 
standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 
166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LR.CP. 56(c); McCann v. 
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McCann., 138 Idaho 228, 232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002). If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which the Idaho Supreme Court 
exercises free review. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87-88, 996 
P.2d 303, 307-308, (2000). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
a. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT 
(AS A LANDLORD) DID NOT HA VE A DUTY TOW ARN THE APPELLANT 
(A SOCIAL GUEST/LICENSEE OF HIS TENANT) OF POTENTIAL 
DANGERS ON THE PROPERTY 
The Appellant begins his argument on appeal by advocating for the application of general 
negligence principles and asserting that this case involves mixed issues of law and disputed facts. 
See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 18-19. Such argument completely ignores the reality that the 
legal duties in this case are narrowly prescribed by common law principles of premises liability 
that have firmly been established by Idaho's appellate courts. The record clearly establishes that 
Walter Amundson was not aware of the broken window at issue or the existence of a wooden 
stump placed in the walkway at the side of the house by one of the tenants. Regardless of his 
knowledge, however, Walter Amundson had no legal duty to warn the Appellant regarding these 
alleged conditions and cannot reasonably be expected to police the rental property to warn a 
particular tenant's social guests regarding potential hazards created by one of the tenants. 
The primary issue in this case is the scope of the duty of care owed by a landlord to his 
tenant's social guest. This issue has previously been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts and 
the rule is clear: while a landlord owes a general duty of care to his tenant (who occupies the 
status of an invitee) a landlord does not owe a duty to the tenant's social guest (who occupies the 
status of a licensee) to warn of dangers that may exist on the property. As a result, the Appellant 
is not really arguing that the District Court erred in its application of the law to the facts of this 
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matter. Rather, the Appellant, relying primarily on Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 
P .2d 41 (1984), seeks to either eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees 
altogether, or expand the duties of a landlord such that all entrants on a rental property should be 
classified as invitees. By doing so, the Appellant asks this Court to ignore established precedent 
and the logical and sound public policy reasons why Idaho appellate courts have declined to 
expand a landlord's premises liability duties to a social guest (licensee) of a tenant. 
1. Premises Liability Law in Idaho with Regard to a Licensee/Social Guest. 
Idaho has clearly established the duties owed by the occupier of the premises to an 
injured third person based on the status of the injured person at the time of the injury. The reason 
these distinctions were created was a recognition that the scope of duty should be tied to factors 
such as the occupier's knowledge concerning the risk, the control which the occupier can 
reasonably exercise over the source of the risk and the nature of the visit and the entrants' 
expectations of what they will encounter when visiting the land. See Keller v. Holiday Inns, 
Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 652, 671 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983). "The distinction between 
trespassers, licensees, and invitees is the controlling test in determining the scope and extent of 
the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 
72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003); See also Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 
814, 816 (1994); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352,356, (Ct. App. 2008). 
The Appellant cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions which have utilized 
different legal standards in analyzing the duties of a landlord to entrants on land. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief, pp. 22-23. However, Idaho appellate courts have not abolished the common law 
distinctions between the duties owed to entrants on land and, as set forth below, have continued 
over the past thirty years to emphasize the sound legal and policy reasons for keeping such 
distinctions intact. 
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As set forth above, there is no dispute that the Appellant was a licensee/social guest of 
the tenant. "A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the 
landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee." 
Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. The "duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A 
landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or 
activities on the land." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals inEvans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 
P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1987) noted: 
A person who enters the property of another with passive 
permission or as a mere social guest traditionally has been held to 
understand that he must take the land as the possessor uses it. This 
entrant, classified by the law as a licensee, is expected to be alert 
and to protect himself from the risks he encounters. Accordingly, 
the duty owed to a licensee with respect to such risks is narrowly 
restricted. The possessor is required simply to share his knowledge 
of dangerous conditions or dangerous activities with the licensee. 
When such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is 
no longer superior to that of the licensee, and the possessor's duty 
extends no farther. 
Id. at 401, 732 P.2d at 370, quoting Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 652-53, 671 
P.2d 1112, 1115-16 (Ct.App.1983), vacated on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 
(1984).6 
Seven years later, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the duty owed by a possessor of 
land toward a licensee/social guest in Holzheimer v. Johannesen (1994), supra. The 
Holzheimer Court recognized the distinction between invitees and licensees, stating that the 
possessor owes an invitee a duty of reasonable care. Id. at 399-400, 871 P.2d at 816-17. 
However, the Holzheimer Court found that a possessor of the premises "is only required to share 
with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." Id. at 400, 871 
6 It should be noted that Evans (1987) was a case that post-dated Stephens v. Stearns (1984), a case 
primarily relied upon by the Appellant, by three years. 
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P.2d at 817. Certainly, the Holzheimer Court would have been aware of Stephens v. 
Stearns holding and yet did not broaden its holding to include guests of tenants in the same 
category as an invitee or eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees altogether. 
Indeed, Idaho appellate courts have confirmed this distinction multiple times. See, 
e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 257-258, 678 P.2d 41, 49-50 (1984) (a landlord's 
tenant should henceforth be included in the category of invitees); Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 
867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988) (the Idaho Supreme Court included employees in the 
category of invitees); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(landlord did not owe victims duty under premises liability to protect them from injury caused by 
tenant's dog); Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) (the 
duty owed to a person injured on the land is determined by the status of the person; the occupant 
of the property must only warn a licensee or social guest of a dangerous condition known or 
which should have been known by the occupant). 
This Court was asked to abandon the duty of care distinctions between invitees and 
licensees in Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 373 (2013). In 
Rountree, a fan at a Boise Hawks baseball game was injured when struck by a foul ball. Id., at 
169. The defendant, Boise Baseball, sought to dismiss the case, arguing that rather than being 
held accountable under Idaho's common law premises liability standards, Idaho appellate courts 
should adopt the Baseball Rule, which limits the duty of stadium operators to spectators hit by 
foul balls. Id. This Court declined to adopt the Baseball Rule in place of the application of 
established premises liability precedent, noting that there was no compelling public policy 
requiring it to do so. Id., at 172. 
Idaho appellate courts have not wavered with respect to the duty owed to a licensee/social 
guest. Moreover, Idaho law is clear as to the classification of the party owing the duty in the 
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context of social guests to residential property, leased or otherwise. It is the possessor/occupier 
of the property, not the owner of the property, who owes the licensee/social guest the duty of 
care. See Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. In fact, in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 
Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), the Court effectively stated that a tenant steps into the shoes of 
the landlord if the tenant is the occupier of the premises and is aware of the alleged dangerous 
condition. Id. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. In Harrison, the Court considered a claim where an 
injured third person sued the lessee and owner of a business establishment for injuries. Thus, the 
claimant there was an invitee as opposed to the Appellant in the instant matter. Id. at 589-90, 
768 P.2d at 1322-23. Notwithstanding, the Harrison Court stated: 
[A] tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so 
far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of· 
injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be 
liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989) (citations omitted). 
In Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970), the plaintiff was a guest at a 
house rented by the defendant Robinson when she slipped and fell down a flight of stairs. Id. at 
677-678, 471 P.2d at 64-65. The plaintiff sued the tenant Robinson, not the owner or landlord. 
The Court affirmed the trial court's offered jury instructions, including an instruction which 
provided the occupier of the premises "has a duty to warn the licensee of the condition or 
otherwise obviate its risks." Id. at 678,471 P.2d at 65. 
Ultimately, the case authority in Idaho is clear that the possessor or tenant of the premises 
at issue is the party that owes the licensee/social guest a duty to warn of known dangerous 
conditions because the tenant steps into the shoes of the owner/landlord with regard to said 
dangerous conditions. This rule represents sound policy because, to the extent the tenant is 
aware of the existence of a potential adverse condition on the property, the tenant is in the best 
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position to provide a warning to the social guest. The tenant is also in the best position to control 
the existence and/or remediation of potential adverse conditions on the property that the tenant 
creates. Furthermore, the landlord has no control over the guests hosted on the premises by the 
tenant. 
2. Stephens v. Stearns Was Intended to Clarify a Landlord's Common Law 
Duty to a Tenant so as to be Consistent with Other Components of Idaho 
Premises Liability Law. 
The Appellant primarily argues on appeal that the Idaho Supreme Court never intended in 
Stephens to limit the landlord's duty ofreasonable care to tenants only and that such duty should 
be extended to all entrants to the rental property. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 23. This 
argument ignores not only the clear analysis contained in the Stephens decision, but later 
precedent which has applied Stephens. The Appellant errs when arguing that the Court 
in Stephens v. Stearns, supra, brought to an end the old common law rule oflandlord immunity 
and held that landlords are required to "exercise reasonable care under the circumstances" 
toward all who come onto the property. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 21; Stephens v. 
Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257,678 P.2d at 49. 
The Court in Stephens abrogated the landlord's traditional immunity from a tenant's suit 
for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions existing at the time of leasing, along with the 
numerous exceptions to the application of the immunity, in favor of the more modern approach 
whereby duties are owed based on the classification of the party entering the land. The Court 
specifically ruled that it intended to "leave the common-law rule [of general landlord immunity] 
and its exceptions behind, and . . . adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances." Stephens, I 06 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50. 
Appellant interprets the words, "in light of all the circumstances" in Stephens to mean "under all 
circumstances," regardless of the status of the injured person. 
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However, the Appellant mistakenly reads the Stephens decision as having eliminated the 
premises liability distinctions between injured third persons who come onto the property of 
another with respect to the duty owed. Stephens, as the Court is certainly aware, regarded a 
situation where a tenant was injured when falling in a stairway that provided access to her 
apartment. Stephens, l 06 Idaho at 252, 678 P .2d at 44. The Stephens decision was therefore 
factually limited to the circumstances of a landlord and the proper legal status of the tenant, i.e., 
whether the tenant was an invitee or a licensee. Stephens did not consider the status of a social 
guest of a tenant. Its holding was limited to the detennination that a landlord owes his or her 
tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257-58, 678 P.2d at 49-50. The Court 
also noted that its embracement of this rule with regard to the duty owed by a landlord to its 
tenant was also supported by the Idaho Legislature's enactment of the statutory version of the 
implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50, n.3. 
As the Appellant notes in his briefing, the Stephens court cited a New Hampshire 
Supreme Court opinion in Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973) to support its ruling. 
However, Appellant mischaracterizes the holding in Sargent and its use by the Court in 
Stephens. In Sargent, a child being babysat by a tenant fell to her death from an allegedly 
defectively designed and constructed outdoor stairway in a residential building. Sargent, 308 
A.2d at 530. The Sargent court found that the landlord owed a duty of care in the case, 
especially where the allegations were related to an alleged defect in a stairway permanently 
attached to the property. The Sargent court also noted that the landlord, who retained ownership 
of the premises and any physical improvements thereto, should bear the costs of repair to make 
the premises safe. Id at 534-35. 
A full reading of Sargent clearly indicates that New Hampshire Supreme Court was 
primarily concerned with the blanket landlord tort immunity that had previously existed in the 
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common law and the need to create a more workable framework for liability in situations where 
the tenant plays no role in creating the risk and can do nothing to remedy the potential hazard. 
Id., at 532. As a result, Sargent is completely distinguishable from the case at bar. Mr. 
Amundson did not create the risk (the tenants placed the wooden stump in the walkway) and the 
tenants were in a far superior position to remedy the hazard and/or warn their guests of the 
potential danger it posed. 
Moreover, there is no language in Step/tens which can be interpreted to suggest that the 
Idaho Supreme Court intended to utilize Sargent as persuasive authority to adopt a completely 
different premises liability framework. Rather, in Step/tens this Court cited Sargent, and a 
number of other foreign appellate cases, primarily for the proposition that there was sufficient 
rationale for abrogating the general landlord common law immunity with respect to the 
landlord's tenant. This Court did not go so far as to adopt a position that a landlord had a duty of 
care to make a leased premises safe for all entrants regardless of classification or circumstances. 
Appellant also attempts to make the argument that this Court has issued decisions post-
Stephens that support the proposition that a landlord owes a general duty of care to any entrant 
to the leased premises. These cases are distinguishable and set forth policy issues that are not 
present in this case. For instance, Appellant cites Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 
486 (1988). In Marcher, the injured paiiy plaintiff was an employee of the tenant and sued 
the landlord/defendant. Id. at 868, 749 P.2d at 487. The injured party was not a social guest. 
The Court in Marcher recognized that an employee is on the premises for a business purpose and 
is more akin to an invitee, a clear distinction with a social guest. The Court noted that there was 
a logical reason for this distinction because "an employee will proceed to encounter the 
dangerous condition in order to keep his or her job. In the present case the plaintiff was 
performing duties on the second floor of the condominium at the request of the tenant." Id. at 
Respondent's Brief - - 15 
871, 749 P.2d at 490. Thus, the Marcher Court stated that the correct standard to apply to the 
circumstance where an employee is injured is that "a lessor may be liable to 
an invitee/employee who suffered injuries proximately caused by unsafe condition of the 
premises even though the danger is obvious and known to such invitee." Id. at 871, 749 P.2d at 
490.7 
The Appellant also cites this Court's opinion in Sharp as authority for the proposition 
that common law premises liability distinctions should no longer be applied in Idaho. In Sharp 
v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 769 P.2d 506 (1990), this Court found that the owner of a 
building had a duty of care to prevent unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to a worker 
employed in the building under the circumstances. This Court stated: 
The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care 
to the tenants of the property was settled by our recent decision 
in Stephens v. Stearns, . . . In addition to the clear rule 
of Stephens, other legal principles favor the recognition of a 
requirement of due care in the circumstances present here. One is 
the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty 
also assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that 
duty. A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system, is 
potentially subject to liability if the security system fails as a result 
of the landlord's negligence. 
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300 ( emphasis added). The primary basis for liability in Sharp was the fact 
that the landlord had undertaken a duty voluntarily and had acted negligently. 
More importantly, for purposes of this matter, at no time did the Court in Stephens, 
Marcher, or Sharp for that matter, discuss and expand the scope of the duty owed to a social 
guest of a tenant. That is, none of those decisions eliminated the traditional status of a licensee. 
Rather, those Courts simply expanded the definition of an invitee to include the tenant of 
a landlord or an employee working on a leased premises, but did not include the guests of 
7 In his opening brief, the Appellant never attempts to cite the controlling opinion in Marcher, opting 
instead to cite as persuasive authority the concurring opinion from that case. 
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tenants. 
Unfortunately, the Appellant refuses to read Stephens in the context it was intended, i.e., 
to reconcile with Idaho Code § 6-320 and Idaho's common law premises liability regime. Not 
only does Appellant's argument represent an unsupp01ied and expansive stretch of 
the Stephens holding, it is completely illogical in light of decades of decisions subsequent to 
Stephens developing premises liability law in Idaho with regard to the distinction between the 
status of the injured person and relative duties owed. 
The Appellant also ignores the fact that this Comi has had opportunities to further clarify 
its holding in Stephens in subsequent cases and has done so. In Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho 
523, 525-26 777 P.2d 1196, 1198-99 (1989), this Court specifically noted that the holding in 
Stephens v. Stearns was that "[a] landlord is required to exercise reasonable care to his tenants 
in light of all the circumstances." (emphasis added). In Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 75, 233 
P.3d 1, 6 (2008), this Court noted that the status of the law with regard to a landlord's duty to a 
tenant is that "a landlord must exercise reasonable care under the circumstances for the 
protection of his residential tenant." (emphasis added). These cases should put to rest any notion 
that the Court's decision in Stephens was intended to establish that landlords owe all third 
parties the same standard of care, regardless of classification or purpose of visiting the property. 
3. The Legal Standard Regarding Duties Owed to Licensees is Unchanged 
Under Idaho Law and Should Remain So. 
Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals have expanded the definition of invitee to 
include socials guests of a residential tenant. The duty owed remains a duty to warn the social 
guest, or licensee, of known "dangerous conditions or activities on the land." See Ball v. City of 
Blackfoot, 152 Idaho at 677,273 P.3d at 1270. Moreover, the appellate courts ofidaho have not 
held that the duty owed to the social guest is owed by anyone other than the possessor of 
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residential property. To the contrary, it is the host, or person in possession of the premises 
deemed to be the owner, who is required to share with the guest his or her knowledge of 
dangerous conditions. Id.; See also Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 34 7 
(1959); Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370, and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at 
596, 768 P.2d at 1329. 
The issue was most recently addressed in the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in 
Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237, 322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014). In the Robinson case, 
Marquardt (the landlord) owned a two-story home and rented the second level as an apartment to 
the tenant. Id. 156 Idaho at 238, 322 P.3d at 320. The apartment's bedroom contained access 
out onto the roof through a recessed dormer. Id. A door opened out onto the dormer and the 
dormer did not contain any railings. Id. 
One night, the tenant brought a friend (Robinson) back to his apartment. Inside the 
bedroom, the tenant opened the door to the dormer to let in cool air and to enjoy the view. Id. 
While the tenant was outside, Robinson walked toward the recessed dormer. Id. As she went 
through the doorway, she tripped and fell, sustaining injury. Id. She sued the landlord for 
damages resulting from the fall on the basis of premises liability. Id. 
The Court first determined that the tenant owed Robinson a duty under premises liability 
standards to warn her that the dormer did not contain any railings. Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322 
P.3d at 323. Turning next to the issue of a landlord's liability to the tenant's social guest, the 
Court of Appeals addressed Robinson's argument that the decision in Harrison v. Taylor (cited 
above) compelled a determination that the landlord also owed her a duty of care. Id. Harrison 
involved a factual scenario where a patron was injured in a fall on a private sidewalk in front of a 
business and sued both the landlord and tenant. The Court in Robinson agreed that the Harrison 
decision stands for the proposition that owners of land are under a duty of ordinary care under 
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the circumstances toward invitees who come upon their premises. See Harrison, 115 Idaho at 
596, 768 P.2d at 1329; Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240, 322 P.3d at 322. 
points: 
However, the Court in Robinson noted that the Harrison decision revealed two key 
First, this expansion of a landlord's duty-to require reasonable care 
under the circumstances-was addressing only the duty owed to 
invitees. Second, tenants are held responsible as if they were the 
owner with respect to third parties .... A landlord generally is not 
responsible for injuries to third persons in privity with the tenant 
which are caused by failure to keep or put the demised premises in 
good repair. 
Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240-241, 322 P.3d at 322-323.8 The Court in Robinson further found 
that although the landlord may have made general repairs to the premises, such acts did not 
equate to a duty to make the premises safe to licensees. Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322 P.3d at 323. 
Moreover, the Court found that the injury sustained to the claimant was not specifically related to 
a negligent act of repair conducted by the landlord. Id. 
The Court in Robinson also found that the landlord did not owe a duty to warn the 
claimant of the dangers of the dormer. Id. Rather, under existing case law, the landlord's duty 
to warn existed only with respect to its tenant, due to the tenant's status of an invitee. Id. In fact, 
the Court of Appeals specifically addressed the claimant's contention that the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Stephens effectively abolished the general distinction of invitees, licensees, 
and trespassers in the context of residential rented properties. The Court of Appeals noted that it 
"[ did] not read Stephens so broadly. Stephens specifically addressed the relationship of a 
landlord and tenant and its holding is limited to that precise context." Id., 156 Idaho at 241, 322 
8 The Court in Robinson did write in a footnote to the decision that a landlord could potentially be liable in 
certain limited circumstances but that the duty of a landlord to third parties is not one of reasonable care 
under the circumstances. Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240, n.2. It appears from a full reading of the 
Robinson decision that such a limited situation would be, for example, if the landlord conducted a repair 
to the premises and the negligent performance of that repair work caused injury to a third party. 
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P.3d at 323. Ultimately, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that, as between a tenant's social guest 
and the landlord, the landlord owes a duty only to the extent that, if the landlord voluntarily 
undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must exercise reasonable care in performing 
such repairs. Id. The tenant occupies the position of landowner with respect to its guests 
because the tenant is the individual in control of the premises during the lease and has control 
over the guests hosted in the apartment. Id. 
The decisions of Idaho's appellate courts in this area also reflect common sense 
reasoning. The possessor of property has the duty to warn a licensee/social guest of known 
dangerous conditions due to the possessor's superior knowledge as to such conditions when 
compared to any other pruiy (and/or because the possessor may have created the hazard). Once 
again, the landlord has no control over the guests hosted on the premises or the activities 
conducted by the tenants. For instance, in this case the Appellant argues that Walter Amundson 
exercised complete authority and control over the premises. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7. 
However, the record is clear that the premises at issue were rented by three tenants and the 
alleged hazard at issue in this case (the presence of a tree stump in the walkway) was created by 
the tenants. The concept of a tenancy clearly entails the landlord relinquishing control of the 
premises and surrendering the right to enter the property at his/her own choosing. See, e.g., 
Worden v. Ordway, 105 Idaho 719, 722, 672 P.2d 1049, 1052 (1983) ("In Idaho there is an 
implied covenant in every lease for quiet enjoyment of the property.") 
It would be nearly impossible to fashion a workable rule whereby a landlord owes a duty 
to warn a tenant's social guests of potential dangers existing on the property where the landlord 
does not control or have possession of the property and cannot reasonably be expected to be 
aware of all potential hazards on the property during the time the leasehold is in effect (and 
specifically at the time the social guest is present) especially where the tenant(s) may be the 
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source of creating such hazards, as is the case here. Moreover, it would be impractical (and 
likely unlawful, infringing on the tenant's right of quiet enjoyment of the property) for a landlord 
to constantly inspect and police the property to rectify potential dangers or warn every potential 
social guest who visits the property. The cun-ent state of the law is logical in practice - a tenant 
(who is intimately familiar with the rental premises) owes the duty to warn his own social guest 
of known potential hazards existing on the property because the tenant is in the best position to 
do so. 
The Appellant's position is also untenable because it forces residential landlords to warn 
every guest of a tenant about any dangerous conditions, regardless of whether the landlord had 
already warned the tenant of the same. Essentially, this would always force liability against the 
landlord for the tenant's negligence in failing to warn a social guest, making the landlord the 
ultimate insurer regardless of the tenant's duty. This result would be contradictory to Idaho law, 
as well as public policy, because it would place an inconceivably costly and onerous burden on 
landlords. In sum, the law in Idaho is well established and there are sound logical and public 
policy reasons for not holding a landlord accountable to warn a tenant's social guests of potential 
dangers on the property. 
4. The Facts of this Case Do Not Present Compelling Reasons to Change 
Established Precedent and Policy. 
The Appellant also has not presented a compelling public policy reason and/or cited facts 
related to the case at bar which sufficiently advocates for a complete change in Idaho premises 
liability law. In this case, Walter Amundson did not occupy the property at issue. Rather, there 
were three tenants leasing the property. Those tenants had control over the property and any 
conditions which may have presented a danger of injury to an invited social guest. However, the 
Appellant did not bring suit against the parties actually in control of the property, including his 
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own cousin (Jon Sullivan) who was both able and under a legal duty to provide warnings of any 
potentially dangerous conditions to social guests. The correct defendants in this matter should 
have been the tenants since Walter Amundson did not place a wooden stump obstacle on the side 
yard in the walkway, did not break the window at issue, and did not move the window next to the 
walkway on the side of the house where it could have been a danger to anyone encountering and 
failing to notice the wooden stump while walking in the area. 
In fact, the facts in this case are far more benign than those established in Robinson. The 
factual scenario in Robinson involved a permanent condition of the land (lack of handrails) that 
was not created by the tenant. In Robinson, the landlord was fully aware that the roof access 
through a recessed dormer did not contain any protective railings, an undeniably dangerous 
condition. Once again, however, the Court of Appeals found that the tenant was in a better 
position to warn his social guest of the inherent dangers related to the lack of a railing and, 
therefore, had the sole legal duty to do so. 
In this matter, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Amundson created the hazard at 
ISsue. The hazard involving the location of the wooden stump, in proximity to the broken 
window, was not a permanently existing hazard on the land. The hazard at issue was entirely of 
the tenants' own making. There is no evidence in the record that Walter Amundson was aware 
or should have known of the hazard at issue in this case. To the extent that the Appellant asserts 
that they are entitled to an inference Walter Amundson knew or should have known about both 
the broken window and wooden stump (as referenced in Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 18-19), 
he clearly had no superior knowledge of those conditions than the tenants, who created the 
hazard. The application of sound public policy supports a rule whereby a tenant who has 
knowledge of and/or creates a hazardous condition should have the duty to warn his/her social 
guests regarding the hazard. 
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However, the scope of Mr. Amundson's knowledge regarding the hazard (or any 
inferences raised by the Appellant that Walter Amundson should have known about the hazard 
presented by the stump being present in proximity of a broken window) is immaterial. Pursuant 
to established appellate case law in Idaho, it was Walter Amundson's tenants who had the duty 
to warn their social guest of the hazard, as Mr. Amundson could not reasonably be expected to 
constantly police the property and warn every social guest of any conceivable or potential 
danger, including those caused by the tenants themselves. Both the wooden stump and broken 
window constituted objects over which the tenants had full control with respect to where to store 
them and/or how to warn invited social guests or otherwise ensure a safe environment for their 
guests. 
The Appellant argues that this Court should find that Mr. Amundson owed Stiles a duty 
to warn of dangerous conditions existing on the property which he either knew about or should 
have known. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 32. However, even if this Court were to modify the 
premises liability standard in Idaho regarding landlords and, as a result, find that Walter 
Amundson owed a duty of reasonable care to the Appellant, there are no facts in the record to 
support a finding that he breached any such standard. Once again, Mr. Amundson did not create 
the hazard, was not aware of the hazard and could not reasonably be expected to police the 
premises to ensure the safety of his tenants' guests with regard to tenant-created hazards. 
Appellant also argues that, to the extent it can be implied that Mr. Amundson had 
knowledge of the dangerous condition presented by the window, he had a duty to share such 
knowledge with Stiles. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34. Of course, Appellant is merely 
speculating as to Mr. Amundson's alleged knowledge, as there are no facts in the record to create 
such an inference. Moreover, the Appellant's focus on the bay window is a red herring, given 
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that the trip/fall hazard at issue was the presence of the wooden stump in the walkway, a 
condition created by the tenants. 
Ultimately, the District Court correctly applied the law in determining that Walter 
Amundson had no duty to warn the Appellant regarding the potential hazard presented by the 
wooden stump and/or broken window. Therefore, the Respondent requests that this Court affirm 
the trial court's finding that Respondent did not breach a duty of care. 
b. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS CREATING A MATERIAL 
ISSUE FOR TRIAL THAT RESPONDENT IS LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF A 
NEGLIGENT REPAIR OF THE PROPERTY 
Finally, the Appellant argues that Mr. Amundson should be held liable to Stiles for the 
allegedly negligent repair performed on the bay window. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34. 
There is no dispute among the parties that, prior to the accident, Walter Amundson conducted a 
home improvement project related to the subject property and removed a bay window from the 
home in order to install a garage door for the property, which would allow the tenants to store 
items such as a motorcycle in the garage. (R. p. 47). Appellant asserts that this action 
represented a "repair" to the property and that Walter Amundson negligently performed the 
repair by placing the window in a walkway accessed by social guests at night and in failing to 
follow up regarding the condition of the window once it was shattered and moved further up the 
walkway. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 36. These allegations are intended to create some 
basis of liability in this case based on language contained in the Robinson decision indicating 
that there is a limited duty between a landlord and a social guest such that "the landlord owes a 
duty to the extent that, if the landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord 
must exercise reasonable care in performing such repairs." Robinson, 156 Idaho at 241, 322 
P.3d at 323. 
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What is missing in the Appellant's argument is cogent analysis as to how Mr. Stiles was 
injured as a direct result of a negligent repair, i.e., the alleged failure to use reasonable and 
ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. While it is undisputed that Walter Amundson 
removed the bay window from the home and placed it against a white picket fence next to the 
driveway at the front of the property (R. p. 48), there are absolutely no facts in the record to 
support even an inference that the removal of the window itself or its placement along the white 
picket fence constituted a negligent repair to property. 
The accident at issue occurred not because of the failure to use reasonable skill in the 
execution of the home improvement project, but because one of the tenants placed a wooden tree 
stump in a walkway. The tenants created a tripping hazard that had nothing to do with the 
window removal project. Moreover, the window did not present a hazard to anyone until it was 
broken by one tenant and moved by another tenant into the area that contained a wooden 
stump/tripping hazard. 
This is another example where the Appellant's argument regarding the window 
represents a red herring. The hazard at issue in this case is the tree stump, not the broken 
window. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff tripped on a wooden stump, falling forward into a 
window. (R. p. 14). Even without the presence of the broken window, the Appellant could have 
tripped and injured himself, whether he fell against the fence, or on the ground, or even into a 
window attached to the home itself. While the presence of a broken window in the area where 
the tree stump obstacle was located may have affected the particular injury allegedly suffered by 
the Appellant, it did not represent the mechanism of the trip/fall event. Again, it is undisputed 
that Walter Amundson had nothing to do with the presence of the wooden stump in the walkway 
and had no knowledge of its presence or danger. (R. p. 48-49). 
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Finally, even if the window could properly be viewed as the mechanism of the accident, 
the Appellant is more accurately claiming that the window was improperly stored in the area 
where the accident occurred, rather than claiming that the project to remove the window from the 
garage was completed negligently. The facts in the record do not meet the Appellant's attempted 
legal theory. When added to the fact that Walter Amundson had nothing to do with the window 
becoming broken or the storage of the window in the location where the accident occurred, it 
becomes clear that there is no legal or factual basis to find that the Respondent may be held 
liable for a negligent repair. 
c. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL 
On appeal, the Respondent requests attorney's fees under LC§ 12-121 and LA.R. 41 on 
the basis that the Appellant brought this appeal simply to second guess the trial court and a 
number of previous Idaho appellate decisions and, as such, the appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, 
and without foundation. See Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. 
App. 1995). Further, the Respondent requests costs under LA.R. 40. 
Respondent asserts that this appeal does not present issues associated with unresolved 
law or a good faith request to extend existing law. The Appellant's primary assertion on appeal, 
that Stephens v. Stearns abrogated the classifications of entrants on land in favor of a 
determination that a landlord must exercise reasonable care to all entrants, is not a good faith 
argument, especially given Idaho appellate decisions subsequent to Stephens which clearly 
dictated that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care only to the tenant of his or her property. 
Further, the exact same arguments raised by the Appellant in this matter were asserted by the 
appellant in the Robinson v. Mueller matter. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Robinson soundly 
rejected the attempt to heighten the duty of care bar against landlords based on the application of 
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over thirty years of Idaho appellate precedent. It was patently unreasonable for the Appellant to 
have asserted the subject appeal based upon the clear and unwavering status of premises liability 
law in Idaho. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court's March 9, 2015, Order granting 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter because the Appellant has failed to 
demonstrate that the District Court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. This 
Court should sustain and conclude that the District Court's decision in this matter was 
sufficiently based in law and fact and that there is no compelling public policy or logical basis to 
change established precedent regarding the scope of a landlord's duties to a tenant's social 
guests. Finally, the Respondent requests an award of fees and costs incurred in defending this 
appeal. 
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